First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Fee Mechanisms
A new mechanism, FPA-EQ, achieves strongly incentive-compatible transaction fee allocation for multi-proposer consensus, securing welfare.
Reasonable-World Assumptions Achieve Optimal Miner Revenue in Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing reasonable-world assumptions circumvents the zero-revenue impossibility result, enabling incentive-compatible transaction fee auctions.
Impossibility of Collusion-Resistant, Truthful, and Non-Manipulable Transaction Mechanisms
New impossibility theorem proves no non-trivial, collusion-resistant, and truth-inducing deterministic transaction mechanism can exist, fundamentally limiting MEV mitigation.
Multi-Party Computation Enables Fairer Incentive-Compatible Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Cryptography, via Multi-Party Computation among block producers, circumvents game-theoretic impossibility results to design non-trivial, incentive-compatible fee mechanisms.
