Cryptoeconomic Impossibility Proves Transaction Fee Mechanism Design Limits
New impossibility results constrain transaction fee mechanism design, requiring cryptographic enforcement to resist miner off-chain influence.
Dual Encryption Scheme Secures Transaction Privacy and Consensus Efficiency
A novel dual encryption scheme maintains transaction confidentiality while achieving optimal communication complexity, resolving the MEV-resistance efficiency trade-off.
Proposer-Builder Separation Shifts Centralization to Block Builders
Mathematical models quantify how Proposer-Builder Separation equalizes validator rewards but concentrates power in a few skilled block builders, creating a Proof-of-MEV paradigm.
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence-Proof Fee Mechanisms via a Burn Identity
Foundational mechanism design proves that off-chain influence-proof transaction fees are mathematically equivalent to a novel burn identity, securing transaction ordering.
Adjustable Block Size Mechanism Binds Miner Selfishness for Social Welfare
A novel adjustable block size mechanism quantifies and eliminates social welfare loss from selfish miners in decentralized order books, achieving optimal outcomes.
