Verifiable Delay Functions Cryptographically Eliminate Frontrunning and Transaction Ordering Attacks
Verifiable Delay Functions Cryptographically Eliminate Frontrunning and Transaction Ordering Attacks
The FIRST framework uses Verifiable Delay Functions to enforce a mandatory pre-execution time lock, making transaction frontrunning probabilistically impossible.
Differential Privacy Enforces Transaction Ordering Fairness in State Machine Replication
A breakthrough links Differential Privacy to fair transaction ordering, repurposing noise mechanisms to eliminate algorithmic bias in State Machine Replication and mitigate MEV.
Shared Sequencers Mitigate Cross-Rollup MEV, Enabling Atomic L2 Transactions
A new shared sequencing mechanism uses decentralized consensus to enforce atomic transaction ordering across multiple rollups, neutralizing cross-rollup MEV.
Succinct Timed Delay Functions Enable Decentralized Fair Transaction Ordering
SVTDs combine VDFs and succinct proofs to create a provably fair, time-locked transaction commitment, mitigating sequencer centralization risk.
Protocol Execution Tickets Capture MEV and Create a New Native Asset
The Execution Ticket mechanism brokers Maximal Extractable Value directly through a new protocol-native asset, fundamentally solving MEV's centralization risk and creating a more robust economic model.
Verifiable Shuffle Function Ensures Fair Transaction Ordering and MEV Neutrality
A Verifiable Shuffle Function cryptographically enforces random transaction ordering, fundamentally neutralizing MEV and securing decentralized sequencing.
Layer One Sequencing Secures Rollups Decentralization and Censorship Resistance
The Based Rollups paradigm leverages the Layer One's block production to sequence Layer Two transactions, fundamentally eliminating centralized sequencer risk and achieving native censorship resistance.
Concise Commitments and Statistical Testing Enforce Fair Transaction Ordering
New mechanism uses concise commitments and statistical honesty tests to mathematically enforce random transaction selection, mitigating ordering manipulation.
Execution Tickets Centralize MEV Extraction through Capital Advantage
An economic model reveals that Proposer-Builder Separation, using Execution Tickets, concentrates MEV extraction among high-capital buyers, fundamentally challenging decentralization.
