Differential Privacy Ensures Transaction Ordering Fairness in State Replication
By mapping the "equal opportunity" fairness problem to Differential Privacy, this research unlocks a new class of provably fair, bias-resistant transaction ordering mechanisms.
Revelation Mechanisms Enforce Truthful Consensus Equilibrium in Proof-of-Stake
A novel revelation mechanism uses game theory to guarantee truthful block proposals in Proof-of-Stake, simplifying consensus and boosting scalability.
Dynamic Mechanism Stabilizes MEV Sharing between Users and Block Producers
This dynamic mechanism, inspired by EIP-1559, enshrines a variable MEV extraction rate to formally balance user and validator incentives for system robustness.
Mechanism Design Secures Leaderless Protocol Block Producer Incentives
A new extensive-form game model and the FPA-EQ mechanism solve block producer incentive misalignment in leaderless consensus protocols.
Application-Layer Mechanism Design Eliminates AMM MEV for Provably Fair DeFi
A new batch-processing AMM mechanism achieves arbitrage resilience and incentive compatibility, fundamentally shifting MEV mitigation to the smart contract layer.
SAKA Mechanism Solves Incentive-Compatibility for Transaction Fee Design
The SAKA mechanism explicitly integrates MEV searchers into transaction fee design, circumventing impossibility results to ensure full incentive-compatibility.
Epochless Batched Threshold Encryption Secures Practical Private Transaction Ordering
BEAT-MEV introduces a novel, epochless Batched Threshold Encryption scheme, eliminating costly MPC setup to enable practical, front-running-resistant private mempools.
Transaction Encryption and Ordering Randomization Mitigate Extractable Value
A new mechanism design model integrates transaction encryption and execution randomization to eliminate block producer control, ensuring provably fair transaction ordering and system integrity.
Differential Privacy Guarantees Fair Transaction Ordering in Blockchains
Foundational research establishes a surprising link: any Differential Privacy mechanism can be repurposed to eliminate algorithmic bias in transaction ordering, providing a provable defense against MEV.
Threshold Cryptography Secures Byzantine Consensus with Strong Order-Fairness
Themis introduces a threshold-encrypted commit-and-reveal scheme to enforce transaction order based on submission time, mitigating front-running with optimal linear complexity.
Off-Chain Influence Proofness Secures Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Introducing "Off-Chain Influence Proofness," a new desideratum proving that EIP-1559 enables miner censorship threats, which a Cryptographic Second Price Auction can mitigate.
Concurrent Proposers and Conditional Tips Enforce Economic Censorship Resistance
Introducing conditional tips across concurrent block proposers creates a mechanism design solution, establishing a Proposer's Dilemma to enforce timely transaction inclusion.
Decoupling Transaction Ordering from Execution Is the Key to Systemic MEV Mitigation
A new Decoupled Execution and Ordering framework enforces fair sequencing by committing to order before content is visible, neutralizing predatory MEV.
Formalizing MEV with Adversarial Knowledge Enables Provable Security
This abstract model defines Maximal Extractable Value via adversarial knowledge, providing the foundational theory for provable security against economic attacks.
Differential Privacy Enables Provably Fair Transaction Ordering
Establishing a formal link between Differential Privacy and State Machine Replication's equal opportunity property quantifiably eliminates algorithmic bias in ordering.
Set Byzantine Consensus Decentralizes Rollup Sequencers and Data Availability
Set Byzantine Consensus introduces a decentralized "arranger" for rollups, fundamentally solving the single-node sequencer bottleneck and enhancing censorship resistance.
Threshold Encryption Enables Provably Fair Transaction Ordering Minimizing MEV
Integrating threshold encryption into the mempool decouples transaction submission from ordering, structurally eliminating frontrunning and centralizing MEV.
DAG Consensus Introduces Novel Frontrunning Attacks Requiring Architecture-Specific Mitigation
The analysis of DAG-based systems reveals three new frontrunning attack vectors, proving high-throughput architectures introduce complex, unmitigated MEV risk.
Optimal Latency Consensus Achieves $2delta$ Communication by Eliminating Inter-Replica Messaging
A new consensus notion, Pod, eliminates inter-replica communication to achieve physically optimal 2δ latency, unlocking ultra-fast, censorship-resistant distributed applications.
Impossibility of Off-Chain Influence Proofness in Transaction Fee Mechanisms
A new impossibility theorem proves no transaction fee mechanism can simultaneously satisfy all prior properties and be resistant to off-chain miner influence.
Time-Averaged Commitment Smooths MEV Auctions, Decentralizing Transaction Ordering
Introducing the Smooth-Running Auction, a mechanism using Time-Averaged Commitments to decouple block value from proposer revenue, stabilizing MEV and promoting decentralization.
Formalizing MEV with an Abstract Model for Provable Blockchain Security
This paper establishes a rigorous, abstract model for Maximal Extractable Value, enabling foundational security proofs against economic manipulation in blockchains.
Time-Bound Schnorr Signatures Curb MEV, Restoring Transaction Predictability.
This research introduces time-bound Schnorr signatures, a cryptographic primitive that embeds an expiry block height directly into a transaction's signature, fundamentally altering MEV dynamics by restoring predictable transaction inclusion and reducing predatory extraction.
Auctioning Time Advantage Optimizes MEV Capture on Automated Market Makers
This research introduces an auction mechanism for transaction time advantage, fundamentally reshaping MEV extraction strategies and enabling AMMs to reclaim value.
Encrypted Mempools Alone Cannot Solve Maximal Extractable Value
Cryptographically concealing transaction data until execution faces fundamental economic and technical limits, preventing universal MEV mitigation.
Proposer-Builder Separation Mitigates MEV Centralization
A novel mechanism, Proposer-Builder Separation, disentangles block construction from proposal, enhancing blockchain decentralization and censorship resistance.
Formalizing MEV for Provable Blockchain Economic Security against Attacks
This research establishes a formal MEV theory using an abstract blockchain model, enabling provable security against economic attacks and enhancing network stability.
Trade Splitting Optimizes MEV Extraction on Fast-Finality Rollups
This research unveils how arbitrageurs strategically fragment transactions to exploit MEV on fast-finality rollups, exposing the limitations of current fee-based ordering.
Formalizing Universal Maximal Extractable Value for Blockchain Security
This research establishes a rigorous, universal definition of Maximal Extractable Value, quantifying maximum adversarial gain to fortify blockchain security.
