Verifiable Randomness Enhances DPoS Decentralization and Security
A novel DPoS mechanism leverages verifiable randomness to unpredictably select delegates, fundamentally strengthening decentralization and mitigating power concentration.
Establish a Randomness Trilemma for Adaptive Secure Consensus Protocols
A new theoretical trilemma proves Byzantine consensus cannot be simultaneously efficient, adaptively secure, and consume minimal public randomness.
Distributed Verifiable Randomness Secures Consensus and On-Chain Fairness
A Distributed Verifiable Random Function, built with threshold cryptography and zk-SNARKs, creates a publicly-verifiable, un-biasable randomness primitive essential for secure leader election and MEV mitigation.
Deterministic Sortition Guarantees Honest Majority, Strengthening Decentralized Committee Selection
New sortition technique replaces probabilistic committee security with deterministic bounds, fundamentally strengthening distributed ledger decentralization and scalability.
Deterministic Bounds Secure Constant-Size Committees, Strengthening Decentralized Consensus Architecture
Foundational research replaces probabilistic committee security with deterministic bounds, enabling smaller, more efficient consensus groups for scalable systems.
Zero-Knowledge Oracles Secure Cross-Chain Communication with Quantum Randomness and Restaking
V-ZOR integrates ZKPs, quantum entropy, and restaking to enable cryptographically verifiable, trust-minimized off-chain data delivery across decentralized systems.
Cryptanalysis Exposes Flaw in Verifiable Delay Function Security
Cryptanalysis revealed that parallel computation bypasses the sequential time delay in VDFs, challenging the security of verifiable randomness primitives.
Cryptographic Randomness and Privacy Mitigate MEV Exploitation
Zero-knowledge proofs and verifiable randomness secure fair transaction ordering, eliminating front-running and democratizing extractable value.
Game-Theoretic Incentives Guarantee Provably Uniform Decentralized Randomness
A new Randomness Incentive Game (RIG) establishes a Nash Equilibrium where participants are compelled to submit provably uniform inputs, securing all decentralized randomness protocols.
