Auctioning Transaction Time Advantage Reshapes MEV Dynamics ∞ Research

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Briefing

The persistent challenge of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in blockchain networks, where transaction ordering can be exploited for profit, necessitates innovative solutions to ensure equitable value distribution. This paper introduces a novel time-advantage auction mechanism, where the right to prioritize transaction inclusion is explicitly traded, thereby transforming implicit MEV extraction into a transparent, protocol-captured value. This foundational shift offers a pathway to re-architect transaction sequencing, potentially enabling fairer market conditions and mitigating predatory arbitrage within decentralized finance.

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Context

Before this research, the primary methods for transaction inclusion and ordering relied on either a first-come-first-serve (FCFS) approach or priority gas auctions (PGAs), where users bid for faster inclusion. These traditional models inadvertently created opportunities for sophisticated actors to front-run, sandwich, or arbitrage transactions, leading to significant value extraction by block producers and searchers. This contributed to market inefficiencies and user losses within decentralized exchanges.

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Analysis

The core mechanism proposed is a “time-advantage auction,” or “Timeboost,” which fundamentally redefines transaction sequencing. Users can bid for a guaranteed time window during which their transactions are processed ahead of others. This is achieved by artificially delaying all other transactions by the sequencer for a predefined period, ensuring the time-advantaged transaction’s precedence.

This mechanism differs from prior approaches by explicitly commoditizing and auctioning off transaction ordering priority, allowing the protocol or liquidity pools to potentially capture a portion of the MEV that would otherwise be extracted by arbitrageurs. The research models the optimal strategy for an arbitrageur operating under this time-advantaged regime, demonstrating how such a system can redistribute MEV.

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Parameters

Core Concept ∞ Time-Advantage Auction
New System/Protocol ∞ Timeboost Mechanism
Key Authors ∞ Ed Felten, Robin Frisch, Maria Ines Silva, Ben Livshits
Primary Application Focus ∞ Automated Market Makers (AMMs)
Value Capture (Equilibrium) ∞ 25% for Pool, 50% for Arbitrageur

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Outlook

This research opens significant avenues for future exploration into dynamic pricing models for transaction ordering and novel protocol designs that integrate MEV capture directly. In the next 3-5 years, this theory could underpin the development of new decentralized exchange architectures that are inherently more resistant to predatory MEV, leading to more stable and equitable trading environments. It also prompts further academic inquiry into the game-theoretic implications of auctioning blockspace characteristics beyond simple inclusion, fostering a deeper understanding of blockchain market microstructure.

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Verdict

This research decisively advances the understanding of Maximal Extractable Value, offering a foundational framework for protocol-level MEV capture and fairer transaction ordering in decentralized systems.

Signal Acquired from ∞ arXiv.org