Bayesian Mechanism Design Elevates Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation ∞ Research

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Briefing

This foundational research addresses the critical problem of designing blockchain transaction fee mechanisms that ensure network stability and fair compensation for miners while preventing collusion. It introduces an innovative auxiliary mechanism method, integrating Bayesian game theory and a soft second-price auction model, to overcome previous impossibility results that limited positive miner revenue. This new theoretical framework provides a pathway for robust, incentive-compatible blockchain architectures capable of sustaining long-term decentralization and security.

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Context

Prior to this work, the design of transaction fee mechanisms in blockchain systems faced a significant theoretical impasse. Existing models struggled to simultaneously achieve dominant-strategy-incentive-compatibility (DSIC) for users, collusion-proofness, and a non-zero revenue for miners. This created a tension between network security, user fairness, and the economic viability of block production, exemplified by the “burning” mechanism in EIP-1559 that secured collusion-proofness at the cost of miner revenue.

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Analysis

The paper introduces a novel transaction fee mechanism by employing an “auxiliary mechanism method” that bridges Bayesian-Nash-Incentive-Compatible (BNIC) and DSIC frameworks. This mechanism incorporates a randomized allocation rule, a “soft second-price mechanism” based on the multinomial logit choice model, ensuring higher-bidding users have a greater, but not deterministic, chance of confirmation. A carefully constructed “variation term” then adjusts payments to guarantee collusion-proofness and positive miner revenue, circumventing prior impossibility theorems.

This approach fundamentally differs from traditional deterministic auctions by leveraging information asymmetry in a Bayesian setting and the burning feature inherent to blockchain systems. The mechanism thereby enables the simultaneous achievement of user truthfulness, collusion resistance, and sustained miner incentives, even in the presence of strategic behavior.

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Parameters

Core Concept ∞ Bayesian Mechanism Design
New System/Protocol ∞ Auxiliary Mechanism Method with Soft Second-Price Allocation
Key Properties Achieved ∞ U-BNIC, 1-SCP, UIR, BF, Almost MIC
Primary Challenge Overcome ∞ Zero-Revenue Impossibility
Underlying Model ∞ Multinomial Logit Choice Model
Authors ∞ Xi Chen, David Simchi-Levi, Zishuo Zhao, Yuan Zhou
Publication Date ∞ December 23, 2024 (arXiv v7)
Source ∞ arXiv.org
Key Mathematical Tool ∞ Revelation Principle
Block Size Scalability ∞ Demonstrated for general block size k

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Outlook

This research opens significant avenues for developing more robust and economically efficient blockchain protocols. Future work involves extending the mechanism to handle variable transaction sizes, unbounded valuation distributions, and more complex correlated or interdependent user valuations. The framework’s insights could lead to real-world applications within 3-5 years, enabling truly scalable and fair transaction ordering systems in decentralized finance, thereby enhancing network stability and participant trust.

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Verdict

This work decisively reframes blockchain transaction fee mechanism design, establishing a robust theoretical foundation for economically viable and incentive-compatible decentralized systems.

Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org