
Briefing
A fundamental trade-off exists between strong censorship resistance and block finality latency in decentralized systems, a constraint formally proven by the new Censorship Resistant Byzantine Broadcast (CRBB) model. The core research problem centers on the observation that protocols delegating block assembly to multiple includers ∞ a necessary step for censorship resistance ∞ consistently incur two additional communication rounds for block confirmation. The paper’s breakthrough is the formal proof that this two-round cost is an inherent, necessary lower bound, not a design artifact. This finding establishes a new foundational constraint for distributed systems, demonstrating that achieving leader-agnostic transaction inclusion is mathematically inseparable from a fixed latency overhead, thereby guiding future architectural efforts to focus on mitigating the effects of this latency rather than attempting to eliminate the cost itself.

Context
Prior to this work, the prevailing consensus paradigm, epitomized by classic Byzantine Broadcast (BB) protocols, relied on a single, rotating leader to propose a block and guarantee its eventual inclusion. While efficient in terms of latency, this leader-based approach introduces a critical vulnerability ∞ the leader can arbitrarily censor transactions by simply withholding them from the proposed block. Recent protocol designs addressed this by introducing multi-includer mechanisms, which successfully guarantee that a timely submitted transaction will be included regardless of the leader’s behavior. The theoretical limitation was the observed, but unproven, increase in latency, creating an open question of whether this two-round overhead was a protocol-specific inefficiency or a fundamental necessity.

Analysis
The paper introduces the Censorship Resistant Byzantine Broadcast (CRBB) problem, a one-shot abstraction that distills the core functionality required for multi-includer transaction inclusion. CRBB differs fundamentally from classic BB by requiring the protocol to output the message if any correct participant has received it, thereby formalizing the guarantee of non-censorship. The analysis proves that the two additional communication rounds are logically required to overcome a malicious leader’s ability to withhold a transaction from a subset of honest nodes.
Specifically, the additional rounds ensure that all correct includers can coordinate and agree on the set of transactions to be included, even when the designated leader attempts to suppress that information. This proof establishes an inherent time-cost for decoupling transaction inclusion from the proposer’s trustworthiness, transforming an empirical observation into a proven lower bound in both synchronous and partially synchronous network models.

Parameters
- Inherent Latency Cost ∞ Two additional rounds ∞ The minimum communication overhead required for CRBB protocols compared to classic Byzantine Broadcast.
- Synchronous CRBB Latency ∞ Four rounds ∞ The proven lower bound for achieving censorship resistance in a synchronous network model.
- Partial Synchrony CRBB Latency ∞ Five rounds ∞ The proven lower bound for achieving censorship resistance in the more realistic partial synchrony network model.

Outlook
The establishment of this fundamental two-round latency lower bound redirects the strategic focus of consensus research. Since the cost of strong censorship resistance cannot be eliminated, future protocol development must pivot to architectural solutions that mask or mitigate the effect of this latency on the user experience. This includes exploring advanced pipelining techniques, optimizing the block assembly and inclusion process within the two-round constraint, and developing application-layer solutions that tolerate or abstract away the delay. The result provides a definitive benchmark for all future censorship-resistant consensus protocols, confirming the trade-off as a core principle of decentralized system design.

Verdict
This research delivers a foundational proof that establishes an unyielding, two-round latency lower bound, formally defining the fundamental trade-off between transaction finality speed and censorship resistance in all decentralized consensus architectures.
