Briefing
The core research problem addressed is the centralization risk inherent in the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) framework, which compromises censorship resistance and creates entry barriers for new block builders. The paper proposes a foundational breakthrough by modeling the block production process as a complex adaptive system within a co-evolutionary framework , leveraging agent-based simulation to analyze the strategic interaction of profit-seeking searchers and builders in a two-sided market. The most important implication is the formal identification of a dynamic equilibrium in agent strategies, which is critically dependent on the probability of conflict between transaction bundles, thereby providing a quantifiable metric for assessing the system’s decentralization and incentive stability under varying market conditions.
Context
Before this research, the prevailing challenge in the PBS ecosystem was the empirical observation that the MEV supply chain was centralizing, exemplified by a small number of integrated builders dominating block creation. This centralization, often facilitated by out-of-protocol auction mechanisms, posed a long-term threat to the fundamental principles of decentralization and censorship resistance. The field lacked a rigorous, dynamic model to predict the strategic choices (builder versus searcher) of rational, profit-maximizing agents under different market pressures.
Analysis
The core mechanism is the co-evolutionary framework , which treats the PBS market as a Role-Selection Game. Agents in the simulation continuously optimize their strategy ∞ either acting as a builder (bidding in the auction) or a searcher (sharing bundles for collaborative construction) ∞ using a genetic algorithm based on reinforcement learning. This fundamentally differs from previous static or game-theoretic models by allowing strategies to dynamically evolve based on market outcomes. The model demonstrates how the system’s equilibrium point shifts from a searcher-dominant state to a builder-dominant state as the probability of conflicting transaction bundles increases, providing a clear causal link between market friction and centralization.
Parameters
- Top Two Builder Control ∞ 50% – The approximate percentage of Ethereum block creation controlled by the two largest integrated builders.
Outlook
This theoretical framework opens new avenues for mechanism design, enabling the simulation and pre-testing of proposed decentralized block-building solutions against realistic agent behavior. In the next 3-5 years, this research will inform the development of more robust, incentive-compatible PBS designs by providing a tool to model the critical conflict probability threshold. The ultimate goal is to design a decentralized block-building market that maintains a searcher-dominant equilibrium, thereby mitigating the centralizing forces currently observed in the MEV supply chain.
Verdict
The co-evolutionary modeling of the PBS market provides a foundational, dynamic framework for designing and validating future decentralized block production mechanisms.
