Briefing
The proliferation of Layer-2 scaling solutions has shifted the core market alignment problem from centralized exchange-to-DEX arbitrage to cross-chain DEX-to-DEX arbitrage, a mechanism previously unexamined with empirical rigor. This research introduces a profit-cost model and a year-long, multi-chain measurement, revealing that the execution of cross-chain arbitrage is highly concentrated and overwhelmingly favors pre-positioned inventory over slower bridge-based transfers. The foundational breakthrough is the demonstration that this concentrated activity structurally encourages the vertical integration of sequencing infrastructure, which centralizes economic power and critically exacerbates fundamental security risks such as censorship, liveness failures, and finality delays across the multi-chain ecosystem.
Context
The foundational challenge in decentralized markets was the efficient alignment of prices between on-chain decentralized exchanges and off-chain centralized exchanges, a problem largely addressed by single-chain Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) arbitrage. The prevailing theoretical limitation was a lack of empirical models and data to analyze the next frontier ∞ the systemic impact of arbitrage spanning multiple Layer-1 and Layer-2 blockchains. This new environment lacked a formal understanding of how latency, capital requirements, and execution methods would influence market structure and the decentralization of critical sequencing roles.
Analysis
The paper’s core mechanism is a quantitative framework that models the profitability of cross-chain arbitrage based on opportunity frequency, asset depreciation, and execution method. It fundamentally differs from previous work by moving beyond hypothetical analysis to an empirical measurement across nine active blockchains. The logic centers on a critical trade-off ∞ fast, low-latency execution (around 9 seconds) requires pre-positioned capital inventory, while the safer, bridge-based method incurs a high latency cost (around 242 seconds). This speed-capital asymmetry creates a natural barrier to entry, ensuring that only a few highly capitalized, vertically integrated actors can consistently extract the value, thereby transforming an economic activity (arbitrage) into a systemic centralizing force.
Parameters
- Total Arbitrage Volume ∞ 868.64 million USD. (The total value transacted by executed cross-chain arbitrage over the measured year.)
- Market Concentration Index ∞ 40%. (The percentage of daily volume captured by the single largest arbitrage address post-Dencun upgrade.)
- Inventory Execution Rate ∞ 66.96%. (The proportion of all successful cross-chain arbitrage trades executed using pre-positioned inventory.)
- Inventory Latency ∞ 9 seconds. (The median settlement time for arbitrage trades executed using pre-positioned inventory.)
- Bridge Latency ∞ 242 seconds. (The median settlement time for arbitrage trades executed using cross-chain bridges.)
Outlook
This research immediately opens new avenues for mechanism design focused on fair transaction ordering across multiple domains. In the next 3-5 years, the theory will drive the development of more sophisticated, latency-agnostic cross-chain communication protocols that eliminate the speed-capital asymmetry. Real-world applications will focus on decentralized block building and sequencing markets, such as shared sequencing or multi-chain Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), designed to lower the entry barrier and distribute the economic power currently held by a few vertically integrated entities.
Verdict
This empirical model fundamentally reframes cross-chain MEV from a mere economic externality into a structural centralizing force that necessitates immediate architectural countermeasures to preserve decentralized security.
