Briefing
The research addresses the foundational problem of designing an incentive-aligned, collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) for decentralized systems. It establishes a powerful impossibility result ∞ the only deterministic TFM that simultaneously satisfies Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) for users, Monotone Miner Incentive Compatibility (MMIC), and One-sided Collusion-proofness (1-OCA-proof) is the trivial mechanism where no transactions are ever included. The foundational breakthrough is the rigorous characterization that any mechanism satisfying these properties must yield exactly zero revenue for the block producer, demonstrating that the pursuit of a perfectly fair and non-trivial deterministic auction in this foundational space is a theoretical dead end.
Context
The prevailing challenge in blockchain mechanism design is the pursuit of a TFM that aligns the incentives of all participants ∞ users, who must be incentivized toward truthful bidding, and block producers, who must be incentivized toward honest block construction ∞ while mitigating collusive behavior and the extraction of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Existing mechanisms, such as First-Price Auctions and EIP-1559, satisfy only a subset of these properties; for instance, EIP-1559 is MMIC but not DSIC, and it is vulnerable to collusion. The theoretical limitation was the lack of a definitive characterization of the design space for mechanisms that could satisfy all three core desiderata simultaneously.
Analysis
The core mechanism is a theoretical characterization using the principles of game theory and auction theory. The paper formally defines the three properties (DSIC, MMIC, 1-OCA-proof) and then, through a series of mathematical proofs, demonstrates that the combination of these three constraints forces the TFM’s payment rule to be equal to its burn rule in the single-bidder case. This equality is the critical logical step, as it immediately implies that the block producer’s revenue must be zero.
The final impossibility theorem (Theorem 4.7) then proves that a zero-revenue mechanism satisfying the allocation properties can only be the trivial mechanism, which never allocates the item (transaction inclusion). This approach fundamentally differs from previous work that sought to construct a mechanism by instead proving the non-existence of a non-trivial one.
Parameters
- Miner Revenue ∞ Zero. (Any deterministic TFM satisfying DSIC, MMIC, and 1-OCA-proof must yield zero revenue for the block producer).
- Impossibility Properties ∞ DSIC, MMIC, and 1-OCA-proof. (The three mechanism design properties that, when combined, force the trivial result).
- Trivial Mechanism Allocation ∞ Never allocated. (The only deterministic TFM that satisfies all three properties is one that includes no transactions).
Outlook
This impossibility result forces future research to strategically pivot away from deterministic mechanisms and explore non-deterministic designs, specifically randomized auctions, which are shown to offer a path toward achieving the desired properties by relaxing the strong requirement of determinism. Alternatively, protocol designers must accept a necessary trade-off, relaxing one of the three core desiderata (DSIC, MMIC, or 1-OCA-proofness) to achieve a practical, non-trivial TFM. The research also opens avenues for exploring non-anonymous mechanisms, though these are shown to be highly restricted to a burned posted-price auction with a constant unique bidder. The long-term implication is a shift in design philosophy toward mechanisms that embrace controlled randomization or explicit trade-offs to manage MEV and collusion.
Verdict
The research establishes a fundamental theoretical boundary, proving that the pursuit of a perfectly fair, deterministic, and non-trivial transaction fee mechanism is mathematically impossible.
