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Briefing

The core problem of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is the fundamental incentive misalignment between block producers, who extract value, and users, who suffer from high transaction costs and information asymmetry. This research introduces a novel dynamic MEV extraction rate mechanism, a foundational breakthrough that treats the extraction percentage as a variable protocol parameter to be adjusted algorithmically. This mechanism aims to stabilize the MEV sharing ratio at a target equilibrium, ensuring that block producers are compensated while mitigating the negative externalities on users, thereby establishing a dynamic framework for integral MEV sharing that enhances the long-term performance and stability of decentralized architectures.

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Context

Prior to this work, MEV was primarily viewed through two extreme lenses ∞ an anti-MEV approach seeking full mitigation through ordering constraints, or a pro-MEV approach accepting it as an endemic cost of decentralized finance. The prevailing theoretical limitation was the impossibility of designing a transaction fee mechanism that is simultaneously incentive-compatible for both users and miners when private valuations and MEV are present. This created a zero-sum mechanism design challenge, where any gain by one party was a direct loss for the other, threatening the system’s overall health and decentralization.

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Analysis

The core mechanism is a dynamic control system that governs the fraction of MEV retained by block producers, with the remainder being redistributed to users. Conceptually, this differs from previous static or purely mitigative schemes by enshrining MEV sharing directly into the protocol’s design space, analogous to the base fee adjustment in EIP-1559. The mechanism uses feedback loops to dynamically adjust the extraction rate based on network conditions, steering the system towards a predetermined target equilibrium. The logic is to leverage the MEV extraction rate as a strategic tool to manage participation incentives, rather than merely trying to eliminate the value extraction itself.

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Parameters

  • MEV Extraction Rate ∞ The variable percentage of Maximal Extractable Value that is retained by the block producer.
  • Target Equilibrium Value ∞ The desired stable point for the MEV extraction rate that balances user and producer incentives.

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Outlook

This dynamic mechanism opens a new avenue for research in control theory and mechanism design for decentralized systems. Future work will focus on formally proving the global stability of the dynamic system across a wider range of network parameters and market behaviors, especially under adversarial conditions. In 3-5 years, this theory could be implemented as a foundational layer in major proof-of-stake architectures, enabling a more stable, equitable, and predictable transaction fee market, which is critical for the maturation of decentralized finance applications.

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Verdict

This research provides a foundational shift in blockchain economics by reframing Maximal Extractable Value from an inherent flaw to a manageable, dynamically governable protocol parameter.

Maximal Extractable Value, MEV mechanism design, dynamic extraction rate, block producer incentives, user transaction costs, protocol design space, equilibrium stabilization, incentive compatibility, blockchain economics, decentralized finance, system welfare, transaction fee mechanism, EIP-1559 analogy, network congestion, on-chain fairness Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org

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