
Briefing
The core research problem addresses the pervasive issue of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) being an external, often harmful, revenue stream for validators and searchers, leading to market inefficiencies and centralization risks. This paper introduces the Execution Tickets proposal, a foundational breakthrough establishing a novel, protocol-level ticketing mechanism. This mechanism enables the Ethereum protocol to directly broker MEV, fundamentally transforming it from an adversarial, off-protocol game into a transparent, on-protocol resource. This new theory’s most important implication is its capacity to facilitate a more equitable distribution of value within the Ethereum ecosystem, thereby significantly enhancing network security and economic robustness by internalizing MEV.

Context
Before this research, Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) presented an unsolved foundational problem within blockchain theory, particularly on platforms like Ethereum. MEV, the profit derived from the ability to arbitrarily reorder, insert, or censor transactions within a block, existed as an implicit, external revenue stream. This prevailing theoretical limitation fostered an opaque and often unfair environment, where validators and specialized searchers engaged in a competitive, Bertrand-style extraction, leading to negative externalities such as front-running, sandwich attacks, and increased centralization risks.

Analysis
The paper’s core mechanism centers on the “Execution Tickets” system, a new primitive that fundamentally redefines MEV extraction. This system departs from previous approaches where MEV was an implicit, external value captured by network participants. Instead, the Ethereum protocol itself issues “tickets” that represent the explicit right to propose execution payloads.
This innovative model moves MEV brokering from an adversarial, off-protocol competition into a transparent, on-protocol mechanism, effectively making MEV a native asset. This approach ensures that the value associated with block production is managed and distributed directly by the protocol, rather than being an external, competitive prize.

Parameters
- Core Concept ∞ Execution Tickets
 - New System/Protocol ∞ Ethereum MEV brokering
 - Key Author ∞ Jonah Burian
 - Blockchain ∞ Ethereum
 - Date ∞ March 5, 2024
 

Outlook
This research establishes a forward-looking perspective for the Ethereum ecosystem, paving the way for a more predictable and transparent MEV market. The potential real-world applications in the next 3-5 years include the development of new financial primitives built around Execution Tickets as a native asset, integrating MEV more directly and predictably into decentralized finance. This theoretical advancement also opens new avenues of research for the academic community, focusing on optimal auction designs for these tickets, their seamless integration into existing staking mechanisms, and the long-term economic stability of a protocol-brokered MEV system.

Verdict
The Execution Tickets proposal fundamentally rearchitects MEV extraction, transforming it into a protocol-native mechanism crucial for Ethereum’s long-term economic equity and security.
Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org
