Briefing
This paper presents the “Execution Tickets” proposal, a transformative mechanism designed to integrate and redistribute Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) directly within the Ethereum protocol. The core innovation involves separating the roles of beacon block proposer and execution block proposer, introducing an in-protocol market where “tickets” confer the right to propose execution payloads. This system aims to capture MEV, traditionally an external revenue stream for validators, and distribute it more equitably, thereby fostering a more secure and economically robust blockchain network. The new theory has the profound implication of shifting MEV capture from external entities to the protocol itself, creating a new native asset and fundamentally altering Ethereum’s economic model.
Context
Prior to this research, Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) represented a significant unsolved foundational problem within public blockchains, particularly Ethereum. MEV, the profit validators can extract by ordering, inserting, or censoring transactions, traditionally flowed to external agents, leading to centralization risks and an inequitable distribution of value. The prevailing theoretical limitation involved the protocol’s inability to directly manage or recapture this value, leaving it vulnerable to external market dynamics and potential misalignments of incentives among network participants.
Analysis
The core idea of “Execution Tickets” involves a fundamental re-architecture of Ethereum’s block production process by splitting the current validator role into two distinct functions ∞ the Beacon Block Proposer and the Execution Block Proposer. A Beacon Block Proposer is responsible for the beacon chain, while an Execution Block Proposer, selected via a lottery among ticket holders, constructs the actual execution payload containing transactions. To participate as an Execution Block Proposer, entities purchase “Execution Tickets” from the protocol, which are one-time use and entitle the owner to future block proposal rights in a randomly assigned slot.
This mechanism allows the protocol to directly broker MEV, traditionally an external revenue stream, and introduces a new Ethereum native asset, the “Execution Ticket,” with its own dynamic market and economic implications. After a ticket is used, it is burned, and a new one is minted for purchase, ensuring continuous supply and demand.
Parameters
- Core Concept ∞ Execution Tickets
- New System/Mechanism ∞ In-protocol MEV Brokering
- Key Authors ∞ Jonah Burian, Davide Crapis
- Affected Protocol ∞ Ethereum
- Core Problem Addressed ∞ Maximal Extractable Value Centralization
- New Asset Class ∞ Execution Tickets
- Role Separation ∞ Beacon Block Proposer, Execution Block Proposer
Outlook
This research opens new avenues for enhancing the economic security and decentralization of blockchain networks by directly integrating MEV capture into the protocol layer. Future research will likely focus on optimizing the dynamic pricing mechanisms for Execution Tickets and analyzing the potential for secondary markets, as well as their implications for censorship resistance. The potential real-world application involves a more equitable distribution of value within the Ethereum ecosystem, unlocking new capabilities for fairer transaction ordering and reducing the influence of large MEV searchers, ultimately leading to a more robust and resilient decentralized infrastructure within 3-5 years.
Verdict
This research fundamentally redefines the relationship between protocol design and economic incentives, presenting a critical pathway for Ethereum to internalize and equitably distribute Maximal Extractable Value, thereby fortifying its long-term decentralization and security.
Signal Acquired from ∞ arXiv.org