First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing Secures Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees ∞ Research

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Briefing

The core research problem addresses the design of effective transaction fee mechanisms within leaderless blockchain protocols, where multiple block producers collectively contribute to block construction, necessitating robust incentives for intended behavior and equitable value distribution. This paper introduces a multi-stage game model and defines the “strongly BPIC” property for block producers, proposing the First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism as a foundational breakthrough. The implication of this new theory is a framework that guarantees incentive compatibility and a substantial fraction of optimal welfare, paving the way for more secure and efficient decentralized block construction in future blockchain architectures.

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Context

Prior to this research, transaction fee mechanism design predominantly focused on single-leader blockchain models, such as those employing Proof-of-Work miners or Proof-of-Stake validators, where a solitary entity held control over block construction. This established theoretical paradigm presented limitations when applied to distributed systems requiring multiple parties to collaboratively contribute to a block, thereby revealing a significant gap in foundational frameworks for incentivizing collective, leaderless block production.

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Analysis

This paper introduces a novel framework for transaction fee mechanisms specifically designed for leaderless blockchains, where multiple block producers collaboratively build a single block. The core innovation is the First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism. In FPA-EQ, users submit bids for transaction inclusion, and block producers collectively determine transaction ordering and inclusion.

The fundamental difference from previous approaches lies in the equal sharing of total fees among participating block producers, which incentivizes cooperation. This design ensures that each block producer is motivated to adhere to the protocol, achieving a property termed “strongly BPIC” (Bayesian-Nash Incentive Compatibility for block producers), which guarantees rational behavior and collective welfare.

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Parameters

Core Concept ∞ Strongly Bayesian-Nash Incentive Compatibility (strongly BPIC)
New System/Protocol ∞ First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ)
Key Authors ∞ Pranav Garimidi, Lioba Heimbach, Tim Roughgarden
Publication Venue ∞ Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC) 2025

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Outlook

This research opens new avenues for designing robust incentive mechanisms in emerging leaderless or highly distributed blockchain architectures. Future work could explore extensions of FPA-EQ to dynamic environments with varying numbers of block producers or different sharing rules. Real-world applications could include more decentralized block-building markets in Layer 2 solutions or sharded blockchains, where multiple collators or proposers contribute to block finality, potentially leading to fairer and more resilient transaction processing within 3-5 years.

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Verdict

This research fundamentally advances the theoretical understanding of transaction fee mechanisms, offering a critical blueprint for secure and equitable block production in increasingly decentralized blockchain paradigms.

Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org