Briefing
This research addresses the critical problem of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), an economic attack on public blockchains that has significantly impacted decentralized finance. The paper proposes a formal theory of MEV, establishing an abstract model of blockchains and smart contracts to rigorously define adversarial capabilities and value extraction. This foundational breakthrough enables the precise classification of MEV attacks and provides a basis for proving smart contract security, ultimately fostering more resilient and decentralized blockchain architectures.
Context
Prior to this research, the understanding of Maximal Extractable Value was largely empirical, with a notable absence of established theoretical foundations for its analysis. Existing partial definitions of MEV proved insufficient for systematically proving the MEV-freedom of smart contracts or accurately distinguishing between legitimate and malicious value extraction. This theoretical limitation hindered the development of robust security guarantees for decentralized protocols and the comprehensive mitigation of MEV’s detrimental effects on users and network stability.
Analysis
The paper introduces an abstract model that conceptualizes contracts as state transition systems and precisely characterizes the adversary’s capabilities. A core mechanism is the definition of “transaction deducibility” (κA(X)), which formally captures the adversary’s knowledge, including the ability to combine private information with public mempool data to craft new transactions. This fundamentally differs from previous approaches by comprehensively modeling how adversaries exploit transaction ordering. The framework then defines “MEV” for a specific set of actors and, crucially, “universal MEV” (MEV(S,X)), which is identity-agnostic and token-agnostic by considering optimal token redistribution.
This universal definition uses a game-theoretic minimax principle, where honest players minimize damage while adversaries maximize gain. The research also distinguishes “bad MEV” by isolating value extractable solely through exploiting the mempool, thereby separating beneficial arbitrage from malicious attacks.
Parameters
- Core Concept ∞ Maximal Extractable Value Formalization
- New System/Protocol ∞ Abstract Blockchain Model
- Key Authors ∞ Massimo Bartoletti, Roberto Zunino
- Key Definitions ∞ Transaction Deducibility (κ), Universal MEV, Bad MEV
- Proof Approach ∞ Game-theoretic minimax principle
Outlook
This foundational theory lays the groundwork for developing sophisticated analysis tools capable of verifying the MEV-freedom of smart contracts. The potential real-world applications include designing provably MEV-resistant decentralized finance protocols and enhancing the long-term decentralization and security of blockchain architectures. Future research avenues involve extending the model to encompass long-range attacks spanning multiple blocks, integrating computational adversary models, and refining the consideration of transaction costs and fees within MEV calculations.
Verdict
This research establishes a critical theoretical bedrock for understanding and mitigating Maximal Extractable Value, fundamentally advancing blockchain security and design principles.
Signal Acquired from ∞ arXiv.org