
Briefing
This paper addresses the critical problem of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) by proposing a novel formal theory grounded in an abstract model of blockchains and smart contracts. This foundational breakthrough provides a rigorous framework to understand and, crucially, to prove security against MEV attacks, thereby offering a pathway to bolster blockchain decentralization, transparency, and network efficiency against adversarial transaction manipulation.

Context
Prior to this research, the pervasive economic attacks known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) lacked sufficiently established theoretical foundations. While empirical evidence demonstrated the significant detrimental impact of MEV on mainstream DeFi protocols, including issues with user fairness, network congestion, and centralization risks stemming from block proposers exploiting their transaction-ordering powers, a formal, abstract model for analyzing and mitigating these attacks was absent.

Analysis
The core mechanism introduced is a formal theory of MEV, built upon a general, abstract model of blockchains and smart contracts. This model allows for a precise definition and analysis of how adversaries, typically consensus nodes, can reorder, drop, or insert transactions within a block to extract value at the expense of users. By formalizing the conditions and mechanisms of MEV extraction, the research provides a basis for developing and proving security properties against such attacks, moving beyond empirical observations to a rigorous, provable framework for secure protocol design.

Parameters
- Core Concept ∞ Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Formal Theory
- Modeling Approach ∞ General, Abstract Model of Blockchains and Smart Contracts
- Primary Objective ∞ Proofs of Security Against MEV Attacks
- Evaluation Benchmark ∞ Real-world Contracts (e.g. Whitelist)
- Impacted Areas ∞ Blockchain Decentralization, Transparency, Network Congestion
- Publication Venue ∞ arXiv

Outlook
This formal theory of MEV opens new avenues for designing blockchain protocols that are inherently more resilient to economic exploitation. In the next 3-5 years, this foundational work could lead to the development of provably MEV-resistant consensus mechanisms and smart contract designs, fostering a more equitable and predictable on-chain environment. It also provides a robust academic framework for further research into the complex interplay between protocol design, economic incentives, and adversarial behavior in distributed systems.
Signal Acquired from ∞ vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com