Leaderless Blockchain Transaction Fees: New Mechanism for Multi-Proposer Protocols ∞ Research

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Briefing

The paper addresses the critical challenge of designing robust transaction fee mechanisms for emerging leaderless blockchain protocols, where multiple entities contribute to block production. It introduces a novel extensive-form game model and the First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism, proving its strong Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatibility (BPIC) and demonstrating significant welfare guarantees. This foundational work provides the theoretical underpinnings necessary for developing economically stable and scalable decentralized architectures that move beyond single-leader block production paradigms.

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Context

Prior to this research, the academic discourse on transaction fee mechanisms predominantly focused on leader-based blockchain protocols, where a single miner or validator held monopolistic power over block construction and transaction ordering. This established theoretical framework, exemplified by Bitcoin’s first-price auction or Ethereum’s EIP-1559, did not adequately account for the complexities introduced by distributed block production in leaderless or DAG-based consensus systems, leaving a significant gap in economic modeling for these evolving architectures.

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Analysis

The core breakthrough lies in a novel game-theoretic model that captures the multi-stage interactions of multiple block producers in a leaderless environment. This model defines “strongly Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatibility” (BPIC), ensuring that all block producers are motivated to follow the intended allocation rules, even with imperfect information about user bids. The paper then proposes the First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ) mechanism.

Conceptually, FPA-EQ adapts traditional first-price auctions to a multi-proposer setting by having users bid for transaction inclusion, with the collected fees then equally shared among the contributing block producers. This fundamentally differs from prior approaches by explicitly modeling and incentivizing collective block production, moving beyond the single-entity revenue maximization of legacy systems.

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Parameters

Core Concept ∞ Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
New Mechanism ∞ First-Price Auction with Equal Sharing (FPA-EQ)
Key Property ∞ Strongly Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatibility (BPIC)
Welfare Guarantee ∞ At least 63.2% of maximum-possible expected welfare
Game Model ∞ Extensive-form (multi-stage) game
Protocol Type ∞ Leaderless Blockchain Protocols

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Outlook

This foundational theory opens critical avenues for future research, particularly in refining transaction fee mechanisms for increasingly prevalent DAG-based and other leaderless consensus protocols. In the next 3-5 years, this work could directly inform the design of more robust and equitable fee markets for high-throughput blockchains, enabling fairer transaction ordering and reducing centralization pressures. Practical applications include enhancing the economic stability of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms and improving user experience by mitigating unpredictable transaction costs in advanced blockchain architectures.

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Verdict

This research fundamentally redefines transaction fee mechanism design, providing the essential theoretical framework for economically stable and scalable leaderless blockchain architectures.

Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org