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Briefing

The research asserts that Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as the principal constraint on blockchain scalability, overriding purely technical throughput enhancements. It details how pervasive MEV-driven spam by searcher bots consumes a significant portion of blockspace, leading to persistently elevated transaction fees and negating the benefits of scaling efforts. The proposed solution involves a paradigm shift towards programmable privacy and explicit MEV auctions, aiming to create a more efficient and equitable market for transaction ordering.

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Context

Prior to this research, the discourse on blockchain scaling primarily centered on technical advancements such as sharding, validity proofs, and consensus optimizations. The prevailing theoretical limitation involved the assumption that increasing raw blockspace capacity would directly translate to lower fees and greater network utility. The concept of Maximal Extractable Value itself, though inherent in transaction ordering, was formalized by researchers like Phil Daian in “Flash Boys 2.0”, highlighting the economic dynamics at play. This earlier perspective often overlooked the economic incentives inherent in MEV extraction, which systematically re-appropriates newly available blockspace for wasteful arbitrage and frontrunning activities.

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Analysis

The core mechanism proposed involves a dual approach ∞ programmable privacy and explicit MEV auctions. Programmable privacy provides searchers real-time transaction flow access while programmatically enforcing strict usage restrictions, preventing malicious activities like frontrunning. Explicit MEV auctions replace the current gas-based bidding wars, allowing searchers to directly bid for transaction inclusion and ordering, thereby reducing wasteful spam. This represents a fundamental shift from earlier strategies, which primarily focused on increasing raw blockspace and often did not address the underlying economic incentives driving inefficient MEV extraction.

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Parameters

  • Core Thesis ∞ MEV is the Dominant Limit to Blockchain Scaling
  • Key Data Point 1 ∞ 40-50% of Blockspace Consumed by MEV Bots
  • Key Data Point 2 ∞ 11M Gas/Second on Base Consumed by Spam Bots
  • Proposed SolutionsProgrammable Privacy, Explicit MEV Auctions
  • Research Group ∞ Flashbots
  • Lead Author (Implicit) ∞ Robert Miller (Flashbots Steward)
  • Date of Publication ∞ June 15, 2025

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Outlook

This research signals a crucial pivot in scaling discussions, moving beyond raw technical capacity to embrace economic and mechanism design considerations. Future research will likely focus on the practical implementation and security guarantees of programmable privacy and the design of optimal explicit MEV auction mechanisms. This theoretical shift could unlock truly scalable and equitable blockchain architectures, enabling novel applications currently hindered by high fees and network congestion.

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Verdict

This research decisively reframes blockchain scaling as a fundamental economic and mechanism design challenge, demanding innovative solutions beyond mere technical throughput increases.

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maximal extractable value

Definition ∞ Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to the profit that can be obtained by block producers by strategically including, excluding, or reordering transactions within a block they are creating.

transaction ordering

Definition ∞ Transaction Ordering refers to the process by which transactions are arranged into a specific sequence before being included in a block on a blockchain.

explicit mev auctions

Definition ∞ Explicit MEV auctions are formalized processes on certain blockchains where participants bid to include specific transactions in a block, thereby capturing Miner Extractable Value.

blockchain scaling

Definition ∞ Blockchain Scaling addresses the challenge of increasing a blockchain network's capacity to handle a greater volume of transactions without compromising its core principles.

mev

Definition ∞ MEV, or Miner Extractable Value, represents the profit that block producers can obtain by strategically including, excluding, or reordering transactions within a block.

spam bots

Definition ∞ Spam bots are automated software agents designed to flood online platforms with unsolicited or repetitive content.

programmable privacy

Definition ∞ Programmable privacy refers to the ability to control and define the level of confidentiality associated with data or transactions.

network congestion

Definition ∞ Network Congestion occurs when a blockchain or distributed ledger system experiences an excessive volume of transactions relative to its processing capacity.

mechanism design

Definition ∞ Mechanism Design is a field of study concerned with creating rules and incentives for systems to achieve desired outcomes, often in situations involving multiple participants with potentially conflicting interests.