New Desideratum for Transaction Fee Mechanisms Reveals Inherent Design Trade-Offs ∞ Research

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Briefing

Existing blockchain transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) like EIP-1559, robust by prior standards, permit miners to extract additional revenue through off-chain deals. This paper introduces “off-chain influence proofness” as a novel, crucial desideratum for TFMs; this property ensures miners cannot gain extra revenue by running separate off-chain auctions. The research demonstrates an impossibility result ∞ no TFM can simultaneously satisfy all previously considered properties and this new off-chain influence proofness, even with flexible supply and miner input. This fundamentally redefines the theoretical limits and design challenges for future blockchain architectures seeking fair and resilient transaction ordering.

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Context

Prior to this research, the design of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms largely focused on properties like user simplicity, miner simplicity, and resistance to front-running within the on-chain protocol. EIP-1559, for instance, aimed to create more predictable fees and mitigate Miner Extractable Value (MEV) by introducing a base fee and tips. However, these frameworks did not explicitly account for the potential of miners to leverage their position for additional revenue through private, off-chain agreements, leaving a critical vulnerability in the economic security model.

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Analysis

The paper’s core contribution is the introduction of “off-chain influence proofness,” a property demanding that a miner cannot increase their revenue by orchestrating a separate auction outside the official protocol. Previous approaches focused on on-chain interactions; this research expands the scope of TFM analysis to include potential off-chain manipulations. The mechanism is analyzed by re-evaluating existing TFMs, demonstrating that EIP-1559, despite its design, is not off-chain influence proof. A cryptographic multi-party computation assisted second-price auction is reconsidered, showing it can achieve this property under specific conditions, highlighting the inherent trade-offs in TFM design.

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Parameters

Core Concept ∞ Off-chain Influence Proofness
Key Mechanism ∞ Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Existing Protocol Re-evaluated ∞ EIP-1559
Key Finding ∞ Impossibility Result
Authors ∞ Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Publication Venue ∞ arXiv
Publication Date ∞ October 2024

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Outlook

This research opens new avenues for designing more robust and economically secure blockchain transaction fee mechanisms. Future work will likely explore novel TFM designs that explicitly incorporate off-chain influence proofness, potentially leveraging advanced cryptographic techniques like multi-party computation to achieve fairness. The impossibility result also necessitates a re-evaluation of design priorities, prompting research into acceptable trade-offs between various desirable TFM properties. Real-world applications in 3-5 years could include new fee markets in Layer 2 solutions or next-generation blockchains, offering stronger guarantees against miner manipulation and fostering more equitable value distribution within decentralized ecosystems.

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Verdict

This foundational research decisively shifts the paradigm for blockchain transaction fee mechanism design by revealing an inherent trade-off between established desiderata and preventing off-chain miner influence.

Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org