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Briefing

The core research problem addresses the hidden vulnerabilities in Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) designs like EIP-1559, which are theoretically sound on-chain but susceptible to off-chain manipulation. The foundational breakthrough is the introduction of Off-Chain Influence Proofness , a new desideratum ensuring a block producer cannot gain additional revenue by running a separate, coercive auction off-chain. This new theory’s single most important implication is a strong impossibility result, proving that no TFM can satisfy all previously established desirable properties ∞ such as incentive compatibility and simplicity ∞ alongside this new requirement for censorship resistance.

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Context

Prior to this work, the academic focus in TFM design centered on achieving properties like incentive-compatibility for users and simplicity for block producers, with EIP-1559 often considered the gold standard based on these criteria. The prevailing theoretical limitation was an incomplete model that assumed the block producer’s revenue was derived solely from on-chain transactions, failing to account for the strategic threat of censorship used to solicit private, off-chain side payments or tips.

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Analysis

The paper’s core mechanism is the rigorous formalization of Off-Chain Influence Proofness to model the threat of a Bayesian revenue-maximizing block producer. The mechanism fundamentally differs from previous approaches by explicitly integrating the block producer’s ability to persuasively threaten to censor transactions that do not transfer a tip directly off-chain. This analysis demonstrates that EIP-1559 fails this new property because the block producer can strictly increase profits by coercing off-chain payments. The research then reconsiders a Cryptographic Second Price Auction, showing that a modified version, where the block producer can set the reserve directly, can satisfy off-chain influence proofness and simplicity for both users and the block producer.

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Parameters

  • New Desideratum IntroducedOff-Chain Influence Proofness (A TFM property where the miner cannot achieve additional revenue by running a separate auction off-chain.)
  • Mechanism Shown to Fail ∞ EIP-1559 (The current gold-standard TFM that is vulnerable to a block producer’s coercive off-chain influence.)
  • Impossibility Condition ∞ Unlimited Supply (A condition under which the paper proves no mechanism can satisfy all desirable properties, including off-chain influence proofness.)

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Outlook

This research opens a new avenue for mechanism design, shifting the focus from purely on-chain incentive alignment to holistic, cross-layer security against coercive censorship. Future work must concentrate on designing TFMs that strategically trade off certain properties ∞ such as simplicity or maximum welfare ∞ to achieve the non-negotiable goal of off-chain influence proofness, leading to a new generation of more robust and censorship-resistant fee markets in the next 3-5 years.

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Verdict

The introduction of off-chain influence proofness establishes a new, non-negotiable security primitive that fundamentally redefines the theoretical boundaries of decentralized transaction fee mechanism design.

Transaction fee mechanism, Off-chain influence proofness, Maximal extractable value, MEV mitigation, Mechanism design, Game theory, EIP-1559 analysis, Censorship resistance, Protocol economics, Auction theory, Cryptographic auctions, Second price auction, Revenue maximizing miner, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Protocol desiderata, Blockchain security Signal Acquired from ∞ arxiv.org

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off-chain influence proofness

Definition ∞ Off-chain influence proofness refers to the ability to cryptographically verify actions or data that occur outside a blockchain network, then securely attest to their validity on-chain.

block producer

Definition ∞ A Block Producer is an entity responsible for creating and validating new blocks of transactions on a blockchain, particularly within delegated Proof-of-Stake systems.

second price auction

Definition ∞ A second price auction is an auction format where the highest bidder wins the item but pays the price offered by the second-highest bidder.

off-chain influence

Definition ∞ Off-Chain Influence pertains to external factors or actors that exert significant impact on the dynamics and operations of a blockchain network without directly participating in its on-chain consensus or transaction processing.

mechanism

Definition ∞ A mechanism refers to a system of interconnected parts or processes that work together to achieve a specific outcome.

properties

Definition ∞ Properties are characteristics or attributes that define a digital asset or system.

mechanism design

Definition ∞ Mechanism Design is a field of study concerned with creating rules and incentives for systems to achieve desired outcomes, often in situations involving multiple participants with potentially conflicting interests.

transaction fee mechanism

Definition ∞ A Transaction Fee Mechanism dictates how fees are calculated and allocated for processing transactions on a blockchain.