Briefing
This paper addresses the escalating problem of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) extraction on fast-finality Ethereum rollups, where low gas costs incentivize spam-based arbitrage. It establishes that arbitrageurs optimally split profitable MEV opportunities into numerous smaller transactions to mitigate failure risk and maximize returns. This strategy, coupled with the observed ineffectiveness of priority fee auctions, fundamentally shifts MEV extraction from an economic bidding competition to a pure latency race, revealing a systemic vulnerability in current rollup transaction ordering mechanisms.
Context
Prior to this research, the prevailing understanding of MEV often centered on fee-based priority auctions and sophisticated transaction reordering on Layer 1 blockchains. However, the emergence of fast-finality Layer 2 rollups, particularly after the Dencun upgrade significantly reduced gas costs, introduced a new landscape where traditional economic incentives for transaction inclusion became less reliable. This created an unsolved problem regarding optimal MEV strategies and the effectiveness of existing mitigation mechanisms in high-throughput, low-latency environments, leading to network congestion and degraded user experience.
Analysis
The paper’s core mechanism centers on a theoretical model demonstrating the optimality of “trade splitting” for MEV arbitrageurs on fast-finality blockchains. This model posits that as the probability of a swap failing increases with transaction size, and given a fixed per-swap overhead, arbitrageurs achieve higher expected profits by dividing a large MEV opportunity into multiple smaller transactions. This approach fundamentally differs from previous assumptions of single-shot, fee-optimized transactions.
Empirical validation through trace-level analysis of reverted transactions on major Ethereum rollups confirms this spam-based strategy, revealing that over 80% of reverts are arbitrage swaps concentrated at the beginning of blocks. The research illuminates how low gas costs, post-Dencun, make such spamming economically rational, while priority fee auctions become ineffective due to intense latency competition.
Parameters
- Core Concept ∞ Optimal Trade Splitting for MEV Arbitrage
- Key Authors ∞ Krzysztof M. Gogol, Manvir Schneider, Claudio J. Tessone
- Target Blockchains ∞ Ethereum Rollups (Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, Unichain, ZKsync)
- Primary MEV Strategy ∞ Spam-based Arbitrage via Duplicate Transactions
- Empirical Finding ∞ Over 80% of reverted transactions are swaps
- Critical Observation ∞ Priority Fee Auctions are underutilized due to latency races
- Catalyst Event ∞ Ethereum Dencun Upgrade (March 2024)
Outlook
This research opens new avenues for mechanism design in rollup architectures, necessitating a re-evaluation of transaction ordering policies and fee structures. Future work could focus on reverse-engineering trade sizes to precisely estimate the implicit swap failure probability function and compare observed chunking with theoretical optima. The findings underscore the urgent need for protocol-level changes, such as effective revert protection mechanisms or MEV taxes, to internalize the externalities of spam and foster more efficient, market-based MEV allocation. Over the next 3-5 years, this could lead to the development of more robust and fair transaction ordering systems, potentially unlocking new capabilities for scalable and secure decentralized finance.
Signal Acquired from ∞ arXiv.org
