Briefing
The core research problem is the systemic risk and centralization pressure created by Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) existing as an external, off-protocol revenue stream for validators and searchers. The foundational breakthrough is the Execution Ticket mechanism, which transforms the right to propose an execution payload into a tradeable, protocol-native asset. This lottery-based ticket confers the right to capture all Execution Layer Rewards (EL Rewards, including MEV and fees) for a single slot, with the winning ticket immediately burned and a new one minted. This innovative approach enables the protocol to directly internalize and broker the value of block production, establishing a mechanism for a more equitable distribution of value and paving the way for a more secure and economically robust blockchain network.
Context
Prior to this proposal, MEV primarily existed as an external, competitive, and often opaque revenue stream, leading to a complex supply chain involving searchers and builders. This dynamic creates significant centralization risk, as only a few sophisticated entities can effectively capture the value, and the resulting competition often leads to system-wide welfare reduction, a dynamic characterized by a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like outcome. Established mitigation strategies, such as MEV-Burn or various forms of Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), struggle to capture the full value or introduce new complexities and reliance on external, opinionated auction systems. The prevailing theoretical limitation centered on how to effectively capture the full value of the block proposer’s one-slot monopoly and redirect it to the protocol in a credibly neutral manner.
Analysis
The paper’s core mechanism is the Execution Ticket , an abstraction representing a fractional share of all future Execution Layer Rewards. The system operates as a continuous, protocol-enforced lottery. At discrete time intervals (slots), one ticket is randomly drawn from the total pool of n tickets, granting its holder the exclusive right to propose the execution payload for that slot and capture the associated EL Rewards. The winning ticket is then burned, and a new ticket is immediately minted and made available for sale by the protocol.
This cycle ensures a constant total supply of tickets (n) in expectation, transforming the volatile, slot-specific MEV into a perpetual, fungible asset. The mechanism’s fundamental difference from previous approaches is its agnosticism to the specific method of MEV capture, as it simply presupposes the value will flow to the execution proposer, abstracting the complexity into a single, clean financial primitive.
Parameters
- Total Ticket Supply – N ∞ The number of outstanding Execution Tickets in the system, which determines the probability of winning the proposer right in any given slot.
- Execution Layer Rewards – EL Rewards ∞ The total value captured by the ticket winner, holistically representing priority fees and all forms of Maximal Extractable Value.
- Market Capitalization of Tickets ∞ A key metric correlating with the present value of all future block production value, serving as a leading indicator of network value generation.
Outlook
The immediate next step in this research is the formal design of the optimal pricing and allocation mechanisms for the newly minted tickets to ensure the protocol captures their full expected value and prevents manipulative market behavior. In the 3-5 year horizon, this theory could unlock truly protocol-level MEV governance, enabling the creation of new DeFi primitives secured by the rights to future block space. The research opens new avenues for exploring how a native asset representing future network utility can be leveraged for protocol bootstrapping, treasury management, and mitigating the long-term centralization pressures that arise from multi-block MEV, which remains a critical, unresolved challenge for the system’s long-term security.
