Protocol-Native MEV Brokering with Ethereum Execution Tickets → Research

The image showcases a high-tech, metallic and blue-bladed mechanical component, heavily encrusted with frost and snow around its central hub and blades. A polished metal rod extends from the center, highlighting the precision engineering of this specialized hardware

A sophisticated mechanical assembly is prominently displayed, featuring a central circular element composed of concentric transparent blue layers, framed by metallic rings and a precision gear-like component. This intricate mechanism is firmly integrated into a deeply textured, porous dark blue surface, while a smooth white arm extends towards it from the left

Briefing

The current external extraction of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) by validators introduces centralization risks and uneven value distribution within blockchain networks. This paper proposes Execution Tickets, a novel protocol-native mechanism, to integrate MEV brokering directly into the Ethereum protocol. This new theory promises a more equitable value distribution and enhances the economic robustness and security of the underlying blockchain architecture. The approach front-loads the entire theoretical picture of MEV management.

A luminous, cratered sphere, resembling the moon, is intricately held within a complex, glossy blue metallic lattice. This abstract digital composition features a blurred blue background, emphasizing the central elements

Context

Before this research, MEV was largely captured through off-protocol mechanisms, leading to an opaque and often centralizing market. This external MEV market posed a significant challenge to the long-term decentralization and fairness principles of blockchain design. This established limitation highlighted the need for a more structured, protocol-level approach to MEV management.

Analysis

The paper’s core mechanism, Execution Tickets, introduces a new, native Ethereum asset representing the right to propose execution payloads. This system fundamentally shifts MEV capture from an external, validator-driven process to an internal, protocol-managed system. The protocol gains control over value distribution by directly brokering MEV, transforming it into a structured, on-chain incentive. This re-architecture aims to align economic incentives more closely with network health and security, moving beyond ad-hoc external solutions.

The image displays two interconnected, futuristic, white and grey oval-shaped objects, showcasing intricate blue glowing internal circuitry. These primary elements are sharply in focus, while a blurred background reveals more similar, glowing blue components, suggesting a vast network

Parameters

Core Concept → Execution Tickets
New System/Protocol → Ethereum Protocol-Native MEV Brokering
Key Author → Jonah Burian
Platform Analyzed → Ethereum Blockchain
Research Area → Cryptography and Security, Computer Science and Game Theory

A close-up, shallow depth-of-field view reveals a textured, undulating surface. This surface is composed of numerous rectangular, block-like units, primarily in shades of deep blue and dark grey/black, arranged in an interconnected grid

Outlook

This theoretical framework paves the way for a more integrated and transparent MEV market, potentially unlocking new designs for fairer transaction ordering and decentralized application economics. It opens research into dynamic ticket pricing mechanisms and the long-term economic stability of protocol-brokered MEV. Such advancements could fundamentally reshape how value accrues and is distributed across decentralized ecosystems in the coming years.

A central, white, segmented cylindrical mechanism forms the core, flanked by clusters of metallic blue, geometric blocks. Soft, white, cloud-like formations partially obscure these block clusters, creating a dynamic interplay

Verdict

This research offers a critical architectural shift for MEV management, directly integrating value extraction into the protocol to strengthen blockchain economic security and fairness.

Signal Acquired from → arxiv.org