Briefing
This paper addresses the critical problem of inefficient blockspace allocation and welfare distortion on fast-finality rollups, primarily caused by Maximum Extractable Value (MEV) strategies, specifically the high rate of reverted transactions. The foundational breakthrough lies in empirically demonstrating that transaction reverts are not accidental failures but equilibrium outcomes of rational MEV strategies, such as trade-splitting and duplicate-submission spam. A formal model is developed, proving these strategies strictly dominate single-shot execution under convex adversarial loss. This new understanding necessitates immediate protocol-level reforms to sequencing, fee markets, and revert protection mechanisms to mitigate inherent inefficiencies and welfare distortion, fostering fairer and more efficient rollup operations.
Context
Prior to this research, the prevailing assumption was that priority fee auctions efficiently allocate blockspace on blockchain networks. However, fast-finality rollups, while offering significant scalability improvements, have exhibited a notable and persistent increase in transaction revert rates. This phenomenon challenged the established theoretical understanding, suggesting an underlying, unaddressed problem within their MEV microstructure that was not adequately explained by existing models of transaction processing or market behavior.
Analysis
The paper’s core mechanism reveals that “revert-based MEV” is a structured, rational strategy, rather than an accidental byproduct of network activity. This mechanism operates by exploiting the latency-sensitive environment of fast-finality rollups through two primary tactical approaches ∞ trade-splitting and duplicate-submission spam. Trade-splitting involves deconstructing larger arbitrage opportunities into multiple, smaller swap attempts. This strategy aims to mitigate slippage and latency risks, inherently generating numerous failed (reverted) attempts.
Duplicate-submission spam entails broadcasting several identical copies of a transaction to maximize the probability of early inclusion within a block. The theoretical model formalizes these observed behaviors, demonstrating that these multi-attempt strategies strictly dominate single-shot execution when operating under conditions of convex adversarial loss, where the cost associated with an attack or adverse event escalates disproportionately with transaction size. This perspective fundamentally diverges from prior interpretations that largely viewed reverts as mere errors or inefficiencies, re-framing them as deliberate, profit-maximizing behaviors.
Parameters
- Core Concept ∞ Revert-Based MEV
- Key Authors ∞ Krzysztof M. Gogol, Manvir Schneider, Claudio J. Tessone
- Targeted Rollups ∞ Arbitrum, Optimism, Base, Unichain, ZKsync
- Key Empirical Finding ∞ Over 80% of reverted transactions are swaps
- Dominant Strategies ∞ Trade-splitting, Duplicate-submission
- Adversarial Loss Model ∞ Convex adversarial loss
- Sequencer Mechanisms Analyzed ∞ Flashblocks, TimeBoost
Outlook
The forward trajectory for this research area mandates the design of innovative protocol-level reforms for sequencer mechanisms, transaction fee markets, and revert protection. This includes developing hybrid fee schemes capable of distinguishing between legitimate and strategically induced reverts. Over the next three to five years, these insights could unlock more efficient and equitable rollup designs, substantially reducing unnecessary transaction costs for users, fostering fairer MEV extraction, and fundamentally influencing the architectural evolution of future Layer 2 scaling solutions. New avenues of research include extensive empirical validation across a broader spectrum of rollups and MEV types, alongside rigorous game-theoretic analysis of proposed sequencer policy changes to refine the understanding of these complex interactions.