
Briefing
The core problem addressed is the lack of a scalable, quantum-safe threshold signature scheme compatible with emerging cryptographic standards, which prevents decentralized systems from achieving post-quantum security for shared asset control. The foundational breakthrough is an efficient, multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that realizes a threshold variant of the NIST-standard Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA). This innovation leverages per-party rejection-based partial signing to aggregate a valid signature without revealing individual key shares. The most important implication is the immediate provision of a practical, quantum-resistant primitive for decentralized finance and public ledgers, securing high-value transactions and governance mechanisms against future quantum attacks.

Context
The established theory of digital signatures, relying on classical assumptions like the difficulty of factoring large numbers (RSA) or discrete logarithms (ECC), is fundamentally threatened by Shor’s algorithm and the advent of quantum computing. While the NIST standardized the quantum-safe ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) to replace these schemes, a practical and scalable threshold version → essential for decentralized key management and fault tolerance → did not exist. This absence created a critical security gap in multi-signature and distributed governance protocols, leaving them vulnerable to a future quantum adversary.

Analysis
The core mechanism is a novel MPC protocol that adapts the ML-DSA signature process to a threshold setting. This approach fundamentally differs from prior lattice-based attempts by incorporating a “rejection-based partial signing” technique. Each of the $N$ participants computes a partial signature using their private key share, and a threshold $T$ of these partial signatures are aggregated into a single, valid ML-DSA signature.
This ensures that the collective can sign transactions with the security of ML-DSA while maintaining the core threshold property → the private key remains distributed and is never reconstructed by any single party, preserving both quantum resistance and decentralization. The final signature remains compatible with the standard ML-DSA verification process.

Parameters
- Maximum Participants (N) → 6. This is the maximum number of users supported in the current practical implementation.
- Communication Rounds → 3. This is the low number of sequential messages required to complete the signing protocol.
- Signature Size (ML-DSA) → 2.4 kB. This is the size of the final, aggregated signature, maintaining compatibility with the NIST standard.
- Communication Cost Range → 10.5 kB to 525 kB. This represents the total data transferred during the protocol execution, depending on the specific threshold configuration.

Outlook
This research immediately opens new avenues for creating quantum-safe, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and high-security institutional custody solutions. In the next 3-5 years, this primitive will likely be integrated into L1 and L2 protocols to secure bridge mechanisms, treasury multi-signatures, and cross-chain communication, establishing a new baseline for cryptographic security in blockchain architecture. Future research will focus on scaling the number of participants far beyond the current six-user limit and reducing the communication cost to enable this threshold scheme in high-latency, wide-area network environments, fully realizing a scalable, post-quantum decentralized web.

Verdict
This scalable, NIST-compatible threshold ML-DSA signature is a foundational cryptographic primitive that closes the most critical quantum-era security gap for decentralized systems.
