Briefing
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks, which exploit transaction ordering and inclusion to extract value, pose significant threats to public blockchains, harming users and compromising network integrity. This research proposes a novel game-theoretic framework for “universal MEV,” formally defining the maximal gain an adversary can achieve regardless of their identity or wealth. This foundational breakthrough enables the rigorous analysis of “MEV-freedom” in smart contracts, a critical step toward designing more resilient blockchain architectures and enhancing the security and fairness of decentralized applications.
Context
Prior to this research, MEV was widely recognized as a prevalent economic attack vector within public blockchains, particularly in DeFi protocols. While empirical studies highlighted its significant real-world impact, a comprehensive, universal formal definition of MEV and a systematic method for proving “MEV-freedom” in smart contracts remained largely undeveloped. The prevailing theoretical limitation was the absence of a foundational analytical framework to move beyond observed phenomena and enable proactive security design against these complex adversarial strategies.
Analysis
The paper’s core mechanism introduces a formal theory of “universal MEV,” defining it as the maximal value any adversary can extract by manipulating the sequence of transactions, irrespective of their specific identity or current resources. This is achieved through a meticulous axiomatization of adversarial knowledge within a game-theoretic model, which considers how honest participants minimize damage while adversaries maximize gain. This approach fundamentally differs from previous empirical observations by providing a rigorous, abstract model that serves as a basis for formal proofs of security against MEV attacks, thereby enabling a deeper understanding of how smart contracts can be designed to resist such manipulations.
Parameters
- Core Concept → Universal Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)
- New System/Protocol → Game-theoretic MEV Framework
- Key Authors → Bartoletti, M. et al.
- Publication Date → May 25, 2025
- Source → arXiv
Outlook
This formalization represents a crucial initial step toward developing robust analysis tools for assessing the MEV-freedom of smart contracts. In the coming 3-5 years, this theoretical foundation is expected to unlock the potential for designing intrinsically MEV-resistant decentralized applications, thereby enhancing the fairness and predictability of on-chain interactions. New avenues of research will likely focus on developing automated verification tools based on this framework and exploring its implications across diverse DeFi protocols and blockchain architectures, ultimately contributing to a more secure and equitable decentralized ecosystem.
