Briefing
A coordinated DNS hijacking attack targeted the front-end interfaces of Aerodrome Finance and Velodrome, two major decentralized exchanges operating on the Base and Optimism networks, respectively. The exploit redirected users attempting to access the legitimate websites to a malicious, cloned phishing site designed to trick them into signing harmful transactions, specifically token approvals. While the core smart contracts and liquidity pools of both protocols remain secure and unaffected, user assets are at immediate risk from any approvals granted on the compromised domain. This vector mirrors a similar 2023 incident that resulted in user losses exceeding $300,000, underscoring the critical, unmitigated risk posed by centralized domain infrastructure.
Context
The DeFi sector has long been aware of the inherent risk associated with centralized components, particularly the Domain Name System (DNS), which acts as a single point of failure for front-end access. This attack surface exists because most users interact with decentralized smart contracts via a traditional, centralized web interface. The prevailing security posture prioritizes on-chain contract audits, often leaving external dependencies like domain registrars vulnerable to standard cyberattack methodologies such as credential compromise or social engineering.
Analysis
The attack was executed by compromising the security controls of the centralized domain registrar managing the protocols’ official web addresses. This compromise allowed the threat actor to maliciously alter the DNS records, redirecting all incoming traffic to an attacker-controlled server hosting a deceptive clone of the DEX interface. The phishing site then prompted users to sign seemingly innocent signature requests, which were in fact malicious approve() transactions granting the attacker unlimited or large token allowances over the user’s assets. This front-end exploit successfully bypassed the security of the underlying smart contracts, demonstrating a successful attack against the user-interface layer of the Web3 stack.
Parameters
- Affected Protocols ∞ Aerodrome Finance (Base) and Velodrome (Optimism).
- Attack Vector ∞ Centralized DNS Hijacking via Domain Registrar Compromise.
- Primary Consequence ∞ User-side Malicious Token Approvals and Wallet Drain Risk.
- Protocol Smart Contract Status ∞ Unaffected, all liquidity pools remain secure.
Outlook
Immediate mitigation for users requires the revocation of all recent token approvals and the exclusive use of decentralized access points, such as the recommended ENS-based mirror sites. This incident will likely accelerate the push for mandatory DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) and the complete migration of critical DeFi interfaces to decentralized hosting solutions like IPFS or ENS/EVM-compatible front-ends. Protocols must immediately treat their centralized domain registrars as a critical, high-risk external dependency requiring the same level of multi-factor authentication and access control as their core multi-signature wallets.
Verdict
This front-end DNS hijacking confirms that a protocol’s security is only as strong as its weakest centralized dependency, shifting the immediate threat model from smart contract exploits to external infrastructure compromise.
