Briefing
The cross-chain protocol Garden Finance suffered a sophisticated multi-chain exploit, resulting in the theft of approximately $10.8 million in wrapped assets and stablecoins. The primary consequence was the immediate drain of liquidity pools across Arbitrum, Ethereum, and Solana, enabling the attacker to convert funds into unfreezable ETH and subsequently launder them via Tornado Cash. This incident highlights a critical failure in operational security, specifically the compromise of a third-party solver’s infrastructure or its associated private keys.
Context
The prevailing risk for cross-chain protocols remains the centralization of key operational components, such as off-chain solvers or bridge relayers, which hold liquidity outside of the core smart contract’s immutable logic. This incident leveraged the inherent security brittleness of hybrid CeDeFi models, where the core smart contracts rely on the integrity of opaque, centralized web2 infrastructure for transaction execution. Furthermore, the protocol’s documented history of processing illicit funds from major prior hacks indicated a pre-existing, low-security posture and weak internal controls.
Analysis
The attack vector was a compromise of a single, third-party “solver” responsible for executing cross-chain atomic swaps. This solver, which held its own liquidity to facilitate fast transactions, was compromised at the infrastructure or credential level, not through a core smart contract logic flaw. The attacker gained unauthorized access to the solver’s funds, initiating internal withdrawal operations to drain WBTC, USDC, and USDT from the protocol’s multi-chain liquidity pools. The immediate, coordinated conversion of assets into ETH and subsequent movement of $6.65 million to a privacy mixer was the final stage of the attacker’s kill chain.
Parameters
- Total Loss ∞ $10.8 Million – Final revised estimate of stolen assets across all affected chains.
- Vulnerable Component ∞ Third-Party Solver – The compromised off-chain infrastructure responsible for cross-chain liquidity.
- Affected Chains ∞ Arbitrum, Ethereum, Solana – The primary blockchain networks from which assets were drained.
- Token Price Impact ∞ 64% Plunge – The immediate drop in the native SEED token value following the exploit and subsequent market sell-off.
Outlook
Protocols utilizing off-chain solvers or centralized relayers must immediately implement multi-signature controls and robust, real-time intrusion detection systems for their operational infrastructure. The incident reinforces the contagion risk associated with opaque third-party dependencies, demanding that all connected DeFi platforms audit their exposure to such hybrid components. This event will likely establish a new security best practice requiring all cross-chain infrastructure to adopt verifiable Proof-of-Reserve (PoR) and fully decentralized key management.
Verdict
This $10.8 million compromise is a definitive case study demonstrating that off-chain operational security failures are the new critical vulnerability for multi-chain DeFi architecture.
