Briefing
A critical security incident involving a centralized domain registrar led to the compromise of the Aerodrome and Velodrome front-end interfaces, exposing users to a sophisticated phishing campaign. The primary consequence was the redirection of legitimate traffic to malicious sites that prompted users to sign transactions granting unlimited token approvals. Forensic estimates indicate that threat actors successfully siphoned over $1 million in user assets, including ETH and stablecoins, from compromised wallets across the Base and Optimism networks.
Context
The DeFi ecosystem maintains a persistent vulnerability in its reliance on centralized infrastructure layers for DNS resolution and domain registration. This architecture creates a single point of failure that is outside the scope of smart contract audits, allowing attackers to bypass core on-chain security measures entirely. This specific class of front-end attack has been leveraged against multiple major protocols, yet the risk of centralized web interface dependencies remains unmitigated across the sector.
Analysis
The attack vector was a compromise of the third-party domain registrar, which allowed the threat actor to maliciously alter the DNS records for the primary protocol domains. This DNS hijacking rerouted users to a cloned front-end interface, which then injected malicious JavaScript to manipulate the wallet interaction. The fraudulent site presented users with seemingly innocuous signature requests, immediately followed by prompts for approve transactions with an arbitrarily large token allowance. The core smart contracts remained secure, confirming the exploit was purely an off-chain supply chain attack targeting user wallets through token approvals.
Parameters
- Funds Lost ∞ Over $1 Million – Estimated value of assets siphoned from compromised user wallets.
- Attack Vector ∞ Centralized Domain Registrar Compromise – The root cause enabling the DNS hijacking.
- Affected Chains ∞ Base and Optimism – The two Layer 2 networks hosting the compromised decentralized exchanges.
- Vulnerability Type ∞ Malicious Token Approval Phishing – The method used to drain user wallets after the redirection.
Outlook
Immediate mitigation requires all users to revoke token approvals for the affected contracts using a dedicated tool and to strictly use the verified decentralized ENS mirror links for platform access. The incident underscores the systemic contagion risk of centralized dependencies across DeFi, demanding a shift toward fully decentralized front-end hosting via IPFS or ENS for all protocols. This event will accelerate the adoption of hardware wallets and mandate new best practices for domain registration security and multi-signature protection on administrative access.
Verdict
The compromise of a centralized domain registrar confirms that the weakest link in DeFi security remains the off-chain infrastructure, not the audited smart contracts.
