Briefing
The digital asset landscape is currently facing a high-volume, systemic threat from sophisticated phishing campaigns that trick individual users into signing malicious transaction approvals. This vector bypasses protocol-level smart contract security by exploiting the human element, granting attackers immediate, full control over a victim’s token balances. The primary consequence is direct, non-recoverable asset theft from user-owned wallets, with forensic data confirming a rapid transfer of funds post-signature. This pervasive threat resulted in an estimated $9.3 million in cumulative losses from over 9,200 unique victims in the last reporting month alone, underscoring the critical need for transaction-level security awareness.
Context
Prior to this escalation, the prevailing attack surface was primarily centralized exchange hot wallets and complex DeFi smart contract logic, which protocols mitigated through audits and bug bounties. The current threat pivots to the end-user, exploiting the necessary but dangerous ERC-20 approve and permit functions that govern token movement. This class of vulnerability was amplified by the retirement of major drainer groups, such as Inferno Drainer, only to be immediately replaced by new, highly-efficient successors like Angel Drainer, demonstrating a resilient and adaptive threat-as-a-service model.
Analysis
The core technical mechanism is a social engineering attack that culminates in a malicious signature request. The attacker uses deceptive front-ends to prompt the user to sign a seemingly innocuous transaction, often a zero-value token transfer or a token approval. Instead of a simple approval, the signed message is a malicious setApprovalForAll or a Permit signature, which effectively delegates the right to spend all of the user’s specified tokens to the attacker’s wallet.
Once the signature is broadcast to the chain, the attacker executes a second transaction to drain the wallet instantly, leveraging the pre-signed malicious approval to transfer all funds without requiring further user interaction. This “malicious signature” is the deadliest weapon in the scammer’s arsenal, as it grants complete asset control.
Parameters
- Total Monthly Loss ∞ $9.3 Million ∞ The cumulative value of digital assets stolen from victims in the last reported month via this attack vector.
- Victim Count ∞ 9,208 Individuals ∞ The number of unique wallet addresses confirmed to have been drained by malicious signature phishing during the reporting period.
- Largest Single Loss ∞ $661,000 in stETH ∞ The highest individual loss recorded from a single malicious signature transaction.
- Primary Attack Function ∞ Malicious Permit / Approve ∞ The specific ERC-20 functions exploited to gain unlimited spending access to user tokens.
Outlook
Immediate mitigation requires a fundamental shift in user behavior and the implementation of advanced transaction simulation tools. Users must adopt a “zero-trust” approach to all off-chain signing requests, treating any Permit or Approve pop-up as a high-risk event. Protocols must integrate real-time transaction simulation and human-readable transaction summaries into their front-ends, translating hexadecimal data into clear statements of what asset is being approved and to whom. The contagion risk is high, as this attack vector is chain-agnostic and scales directly with user adoption, necessitating an industry-wide push for better wallet-level security and user education.
Verdict
The current threat landscape is defined by the weaponization of legitimate smart contract functions, confirming that the most critical vulnerability in Web3 remains the unverified signature of the end-user.
