Briefing
The official website for the PEPE memecoin was compromised, resulting in a malicious front-end injection that redirected visitors to a fraudulent interface. This attack bypassed user trust in the official domain to lure them into approving a malicious transaction that enabled asset theft. The exploit leveraged the sophisticated “Inferno Drainer” malware, a service that has demonstrated a high operational tempo by infecting an estimated 2,400 decentralized applications per week across the ecosystem. This incident is a clear demonstration that Web2-style operational security failures are a persistent and high-volume threat vector for Web3 asset holders.
Context
Before this incident, the prevailing threat landscape already classified front-end and DNS hijacking as a critical, non-smart contract vulnerability class. This vector exploits the centralized Web2 infrastructure → specifically the domain host or third-party dependencies → that many decentralized applications rely on for their user interface. The attacker did not exploit the underlying smart contract logic but rather the user’s implicit trust in the official domain, which is a known and difficult-to-mitigate human-factor risk.
Analysis
The attack vector was a malicious script injection into the official website’s front-end, likely via a compromise of the site’s host or a third-party component. This script either redirected the user to a phishing site or overlaid the legitimate interface with a fraudulent transaction request. The core mechanic relied on tricking the user into signing a seemingly innocuous transaction, which was, in reality, a malicious setApprovalForAll call. By granting the attacker’s address unlimited spending authority over a user’s tokens, the associated wallet drainer malware was then able to systematically sweep all approved assets from the connected wallet.
Parameters
- Vector → Front-End Compromise / Malicious Redirect
- Exploit Tool → Inferno Drainer Malware
- Vulnerability Type → Malicious Script Injection & Trust Exploitation
- Observed Scale → 2,400 DApps Infected Weekly (Inferno Drainer’s scale)
Outlook
Users must immediately revoke all token approvals for the affected protocol and adopt a “least privilege” security posture by only approving tokens as needed. For all protocols, this incident necessitates the immediate implementation of robust Content Security Policies (CSP) to restrict unauthorized script execution and a multi-layer security audit of all third-party front-end dependencies. The continued evolution of wallet drainer services like Inferno Drainer underscores that the defense perimeter for Web3 must extend beyond smart contract code to encompass the entire user-facing supply chain.
