Briefing
The latest attack vector targets user operational security (OpSec), compromising over a thousand users via a malicious airdrop claim that drained more than $130,000 in approved assets. The incident centered on the @dexmaxai DMT airdrop, where users were socially engineered to sign a transaction that granted a malicious contract unlimited token approval. This attack bypasses hardware wallet protection by leveraging the user’s own authorized signature, a critical vulnerability in the ERC-20 standard.
Context
The prevailing threat landscape is characterized by a shift from complex smart contract exploits to scalable, user-facing social engineering attacks. The fundamental risk factor remains the widespread practice of granting infinite token allowances, which turns a single future contract compromise or a malicious front-end interaction into a catastrophic asset loss event. This attack class exploits the user’s trust and the permissioned nature of the approve() function, even when the core protocol contracts are secure.
Analysis
The attack chain began with a phishing campaign disguised as an airdrop claim for the DMT token. Upon connecting their wallet to the malicious interface, users were prompted to sign an additional, hidden transaction that was not the token claim but an approve() function call, granting the attacker’s contract unlimited spending power over the user’s other tokens. The attacker then executed a transferFrom() call to siphon the approved assets and immediately bridged them to Ethereum for laundering, demonstrating a multi-chain profit extraction strategy. The swift shutdown of the project’s website suggests a planned rug pull utilizing this malicious approval vector.
Parameters
- Total Funds Drained ∞ $130,000 USD. A very brief explanation ∞ The minimum reported total value stolen from compromised user wallets.
- Users Compromised ∞ Over 1,000. A very brief explanation ∞ The number of individual wallets that executed the malicious token approval.
- Attack Vector Type ∞ Malicious Token Approval. A very brief explanation ∞ Exploited the ERC-20 approve() function via a phishing front-end.
Outlook
Immediate mitigation requires all users who interacted with the airdrop to revoke all active token approvals immediately using a dedicated revocation tool. This incident will further establish the need for wallets to implement granular, transaction-simulation security features that clearly display the actual function being called (e.g. approve vs. transfer ) and the unlimited nature of the allowance. Protocols must also move toward time-bound or single-use approvals to minimize user exposure to this persistent class of threat.
Verdict
The weaponization of token approvals via social engineering represents a critical and scalable OpSec failure, shifting the primary attack surface from contract code to the end-user.
