Briefing
A user’s Safe multi-signature wallet was compromised in a sophisticated contract impersonation attack on September 12, 2025, resulting in the loss of $3.047 million in USDC. The incident involved an attacker deploying a malicious contract designed to mimic the legitimate Request Finance Batch Payment contract, leveraging near-identical addresses to deceive the victim. This breach underscores the critical risk associated with hidden malicious approvals within seemingly legitimate batch transactions, with the stolen funds subsequently routed through Tornado Cash, rendering recovery highly improbable.
Context
Prior to this incident, the Web3 ecosystem faced persistent threats from various forms of social engineering and contract manipulation, often exploiting user vigilance or complex transaction flows. The inherent trust placed in verified contract addresses and familiar application interfaces created an attack surface where subtle discrepancies could lead to significant financial compromise. The prevalence of multi-signature wallets, while enhancing security through distributed control, also introduced a new layer of complexity in transaction verification, which attackers could exploit through sophisticated impersonation tactics.
Analysis
The attack’s technical mechanics centered on a meticulously crafted contract impersonation. The threat actor deployed a malicious smart contract that closely replicated the legitimate Request Finance Batch Payment contract, specifically by ensuring near-identical starting and ending characters in the contract address. While interacting with the authentic Request Finance application interface, the victim executed a batch transaction that, unbeknownst to them, contained a hidden approval to this malicious, impersonating contract.
This deceptive approval granted the attacker control, enabling the draining of $3.047 million in USDC from the victim’s 2/4 Safe multi-sig wallet. The immediate swap of stolen funds to ETH and subsequent transfer to Tornado Cash effectively obfuscated the transaction trail, demonstrating a premeditated strategy to impede asset recovery.
Parameters
- Protocol Targeted → Safe (multi-sig wallet), Request Finance (impersonated contract)
- Attack Vector → Contract Impersonation via Malicious Batch Transaction Approval
- Financial Impact → $3.047 Million USDC
- Date of Incident → September 12, 2025
- Funds Destination → Tornado Cash (after swapping to ETH)
- Affected Wallet Type → 2/4 Safe Multi-sig Wallet
- Security Firm Alert → Scam Sniffer
Outlook
This incident highlights the evolving sophistication of on-chain social engineering, where attackers exploit visual trust cues and the complexity of batch transactions. Immediate mitigation for users involves meticulous, character-by-character verification of all contract addresses, especially during multi-signature approvals, and heightened skepticism towards any transaction requiring hidden or unusual permissions. Protocols must enhance front-end security to detect and warn against contract impersonation attempts, potentially integrating Levenshtein distance checks for address similarity. This event will likely accelerate the adoption of advanced transaction simulation tools and real-time on-chain monitoring for malicious contract interactions, establishing new best practices for user education and protocol-level defenses against deceptive approvals.
Verdict
The exploitation of trust through sophisticated contract impersonation within batch transactions represents a critical and evolving threat, demanding an immediate re-evaluation of user verification practices and enhanced protocol-level defenses to safeguard digital assets.
Signal Acquired from → Blockchainreporter.net
